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The Realities and Relevance of Japan’s Great Recession 
 
Adam S. Posen2 
 
 “Human beings share the same common problems. A film can only be understood if it depicts 
these properly.” – Akira Kurosawa (1910-1998) 
 
What really happened when Japan’s economic success story of the preceding decades 
turned into a decade of unprecedented stagnation from 1992 to 2002?  What is the relevance of 
that experience for what the other advanced economies, particularly the United Kingdom, are 
facing today? In other words, what does it mean for an economy to “turn Japanese” and what 
determines whether it will?  
 
 In light of today’s global financial crisis following sizable asset price bubbles, the 
accumulation of public debt, the cutting of most central banks’ instrument interest rates to 
effectively zero levels, the widespread failure or impairment of systemically important financial 
institutions, and the worrisome trends towards deflation emerging in some major economies—all 
seen previously in Japan’s Great Recession—seem to me like potentially important questions to 
address.3 I am afraid that my answers to them will be only partly reassuring. My argument in 
brief is that: 
 
• Japan’s Great Recession was the result of a series of macroeconomic and financial policy 
mistakes.  Thus, it was largely avoidable once the initial shock from the bubble bursting 
had passed.  This is demonstrated by the underappreciated strength of Japan’s recovery 
once policies were reversed in 2002-03 under the leadership of Prime Minister Koizumi, 
Economics Minister Takenaka, and Bank of Japan Governor Fukui. 
 
2 My current research in this area is supported by a grant from the Ford Foundation, which I gratefully acknowledge.  
Thomas Hellebrandt and Neil Meads have provided excellent research assistance with this work.  My earlier 
research on which I draw was partially supported by generous grants to PIIE by Sony Corporation (through the Akio 
Morita Studies Program) and by Toyota Motor Corporation.  The views expressed here are solely my own, and not 
those of the Bank of England, the MPC, or any of its staff, or of PIIE.  The main text of this speech was previously 
delivered at the London School of Economics on May 24, 2010. 
 
3 The inestimable Paul Krugman recently brought this prospect up in his column just last week: “Lost Decade 





• Japan actually had a number of structural advantages that made its stagnation all the more 
avoidable, particularly with respect to fiscal policy.  Structural deficiencies in Japan’s 
financial system and in its corporate governance offset these when the deflation persisted. 
• The aberration in Japan’s recession was not the behaviour of growth, which is best seen 
as a series of recoveries aborted by policy errors – a sawtooth, not a flatline. Rather, the 
surprise was the persistent steadiness of limited deflation, even after recovery took place.  
This strikes me as a more fundamental challenge to our basic macroeconomic 
understanding than is commonly recognized, and we need more research on it. 
• The UK and US economies are at low risk of turning Japanese in the sense of having 
recurrent recessions through macroeconomic policy mistakes - but deflation itself cannot 
be ruled out.  The UK worryingly combines a couple of financial parallels to Japan with 
far less room for fiscal action to compensate for them than Japan had.  More active 
investors and greater openness in the UK than in Japan may be able to turn this around.  
• One major problem which Japan did not face during its Great Recession was poor 
prospects for external demand and the need to reallocate productive resources across 
export sectors.  The UK, US, and many Euro Area economies do now face this challenge 
simultaneously, which may limit the pace of, and our share in, the global recovery. 
Ultimately, my main analytic point is for people to stop thinking of ‘turning Japanese’ as a 
syndrome, some sort of strange condition into which an economy can fall.4  Instead, we should 
think of Japan’s Great Recession as largely demonstrating the validity of much textbook, even 
old fashioned Keynesian, macroeconomics – and thus amenable both to comprehension and, 
within limits, avoidance, or at least amelioration.  As a result, while our economies in Europe 
and the US may not ever ‘turn Japanese,’ we all share some risks and problems in common with 
Japan circa 1995.  The sense of exoticism of the Japanese economy, shared by many scholars let 
alone commentators, inside and outside Japan is even more misleading now than it was when 
Americans and Europeans looked wonderingly at Japan’s miraculous economic performance of 
the 1950s-1980s. 
 





In this, I am inspired by the legendary Japanese film director Akira Kurosawa, who was known 
for bringing universal human concerns and motifs back and forth from the West to Japan5.  
While historical context mattered greatly in his films, he was able to emphasize the underlying 
common themes and see analogies across cultures.  Shakespeare and Hollywood westerns 
inspired his classic films Throne of Blood, The Hidden Fortress, Ran, and the Seven Samurai, 
which in turn led to The Magnificent Seven, A Bug’s Life, and Star Wars in the US.  Kurosawa’s 
assertion of Western models’ relevance to Japanese experience was initially controversial at 
home, and the globalization of his work was seen as suspect, but proved ultimately to be 
vindicated by its global reception.  Japan’s economic experience is similarly of universal 
relevance, offering parallels to today, but not some alternative state of the world. 
Not Ran: Japan’s economic fate was not sealed by the bubble – 
In Kurosawa’s Ran, a retelling of King Lear, at the start of the film the old monarch makes a bad 
allocation of assets – control of his land and forces - to some of his less than trustworthy 
managers, and fails to exercise proper oversight.  The result is a painful and unavoidable 
downfall, through dispossession, war, destruction, and death. Sometimes one gets the feeling that 
is how many observers see Japan’s Great Recession: a mistaken decision was made with regard 
to over-investment, or to monetary ease encouraging that investment, in the 1980s, and the rest 
was inevitable.  Huge bubbles built up in equities and real estate, corporate and household 
balance sheets became leveraged, banks became fragile, and according to this story, once asset 
prices crashed, the stagnation of the Japanese economy was the unavoidable result.6  Others 
claimed that Japan had a huge build-up of structural problems that could no longer borne, or 
even had a negative productivity shock, to the same effect: inexorable decline (Proponents of 
demographic decline as an explanation of Japan’s problems also fit in this structural slump 
camp). Japan then supposedly went into a protracted period of slow and sometimes negative 
growth, and policy attempts to reverse this were futile at best.  One hears similar characterization 
today from some quarters of the prospects for the UK and other economies which faced bubbles 
bursting in the last couple of years.   
 
5 See Galbraith (2002), Prince (1999), and Richie (1998) for discussion of Kurosawa’s cinema and life. 
6 Sophisticated analyses sometimes used to buttress this argument include Bayoumi (2001) and Hoshi and Kashyap 





Like Lear and Ran, this is a compelling narrative for economic discussion, one that encourages 
the viewer to ponder the folly of those who believe too much in their power to see the future and 
are too confident in the good times of today.  For all its dramatic and seemingly ethical power, 
however, it is not a narrative that fits the facts of Japan’s experience.  As I put it in Posen 
(2004a), it takes more than a bubble to become Japan.  As shown in figure 1, Japanese real GDP 
growth was far from flat during the lost decade, let alone in the time since 2002.  Yes, there were 
severe recessions in 1997-1999 and 2001-2002, following the recession upon the initial impact of 
Japanese bubbles bursting in 1992.  But, in between, the Japanese economy recovered, growing 
steadily for two or three years at a time.  And while these recoveries were not enormously rapid, 
neither were they paltry by the standards of an advanced economy at the global technological 
frontier, nor out of line with the kinds of recovery we can see in most economies following a 
financial crisis, i.e., a return to trend growth rates without much catch-up (Posen (2004a, 
2010b)).   
More importantly, these recoveries in Japan in the 1990s were not in any sense artificial, as in 
bought solely through government borrowing or export markets, though both factors of course 
contributed as they should to an economy in recession.  As I first argued in Posen (1998), and 
with additional data to draw on and analyses with Ken Kuttner in Kuttner and Posen (2001), 
these were recoveries which could have been sustainable, but were cut off by macroeconomic 
policy mistakes.  Figure 2 breaks down the components of quarterly Japanese real GDP growth 
during the worst of the lost decade.  One can see that understandably a decline in private 
investment following the bubble drove the initial 1992-1994 recession, and that during the 
recovery private consumption and investment growth played a greater role than either public 
spending or net exports (the latter actually negative for most of 1994-1997).   
It was then withdrawal of public investment and zeroing out of public consumption, along with 
banking problems, which provided the negative shock in 1997 leading to the renewed recession 
of 1998-1999.7  Insufficiently loosened monetary policy contributed, a point to which I will 
return later.  As shown in Figure 3, continuing the GDP breakdown through the 2000s, the 
 
7 In Kuttner and Posen (2001, 2002), we more carefully estimate the size and relative importance of the fiscal shock 
using a VAR framework, building on Blanchard and Perotti’s (2002) techniques, though the extent of the fiscal 





Japanese economy recovered strongly in 2000-2001, a period of withdrawal of public investment 
(again) and limited public consumption (driven by automatic stabilizers); the public sector side 
of GDP is shown in more detail in Figures 4 and 5.  At this point, it was mounting financial 
fragility in the core of Japan’s banking system, exacerbated by fears of monetary tightening, that 
provided the negative shock leading to a sharp collapse in private investment, driving the 
economy back into recession.8  Again, the picture is that of a market economy showing some 
natural tendencies to recovery being stymied by policy mistakes. 
The subsequent recovery of Japan from late 2002 up until the global financial crisis of summer 
2008 is equally telling.  As I argued in Posen (2001a), there was good reason to think that 
Japan’s underlying potential growth rate was not only undiminished by the recession (though 
less than it appeared in to be in the late 1980s), but actually had increased due to structural 
reforms undertaken over the course of the 1990s.  These included, energy market deregulation, 
some better utilization of women in the workforce, new entrants in retail due to the rise of 
Chinese and East Asian production and telecoms deregulation (under US pressure), as well as 
financial market liberalization.9 What was necessary was the clean-up and recapitalization of the 
banking system, the further loosening of monetary policy (to the extent possible given that 
interest rates were at zero), and the avoidance of any further premature fiscal tightening, as I set 
out in Posen (1998, 1999a, and 2001b).  This was obviously not a simple list, economically or 
politically.  Yet, it was also not a list of the impossible, it emphasized demand side factors, and 
was a list that seemed all the more plausible when Japanese policymakers recognized that Japan 
was not doomed to a permanently low trend growth rate – a belief that had bedevilled both fiscal 
and monetary policy decisions in Japan for much of the 1990s. 
Japan’s new economic leadership in the early 2000s, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, Cabinet 
Office and later Financial Services Minister Heizo Takenaka, and Bank of Japan Governor 
Toshihiko Fukui, turned matters around.  They reversed monetary policies that contributed to 
deflation, turned the fiscal impulse to average net zero (see figure 5), and forced bad loan write-
 
8 See Kuttner and Posen (2004), Posen (2001), and Hoshi and Kashyap (2004) for analyses of these factors. 
9 Yes, juxtaposed with fragile banks, which was part of the problem; see Hoshi and Kashyap (1999), Shimizu 






offs and recapitalization by the Japanese banks (figure 6).10  What few seem to appreciate, either 
inside or outside of Japan, is just how strong the resulting Japanese recovery from 2002-2008 
was.  It was the longest unbroken recovery of Japan’s postwar history, and, while not as strong as 
pre-bubble Japanese performance, was in fact stronger than the growth in comparable economies 
even when fuelled by their own bubbles. 
As shown in figure 7, Japanese annual total factor productivity growth was the highest or second 
highest among the G5 (France, Germany, Japan, UK, US) in most pre-crisis years of the last 
decade – the recovery was no simple sopping up of idle resources.  Looking at the averages for 
the period between the start of Japanese recovery (2002:Q2) and the start of the global crisis 
(2008:Q3), given in Figure 8, Japan had the highest average annual GDP growth per worker and 
by far the highest annual TFP growth.  In Posen (2002a), I had made the case that the high rate of 
technological innovation in Japan was largely unchanged over the course of the 1990s, and that 
shortfalls in private investment due to the preceding recessions were demand (or financially) 
rather than productivity driven – this case is borne out by the subsequent productivity 
performance of Japan that I just documented.11  
It is worth belabouring this point, not just to give myself credit for getting a call or two correct.  
It is worth belabouring this point to emphasize that Japan was not in structural decline during the 
1990s, that the series of recessions were demand (and macroeconomic policy) driven and were 
not real business cycles, that therefore this was avoidable and policy could help matters.  This 
illustrates what has become known at the Bank as ‘Adam’s left-arm principle’ – the workers and 
investors of Japan did not wake up one day in 1992 and find that their left arms had fallen off, 
and, for that matter, the workers and investors of the United Kingdom still have their left arms, 
too.  In other words, policymakers and economists must not reason backwards from a period of 
growth shortfall that aggregate supply or growth potential have significantly fallen, and lower 
their sights for policy response as a result.  
 
10 Posen (2004b) sets out “What Went Right in Japan.”  See also Posen (2009a) for discussion of this policy success. 
11 This raises the issue of how the banking sector disruption and fabled misallocation of capital in the Japanese 
economy did not result in worse structural harms to productivity.  I am working on research in this area, supported 





The real costs of recession and even financial crisis tend to accumulate over time as job loss 
turns to long-term unemployment, and as financial disruption turns to under-investment and 
capital misallocation.  This is why a number of central bankers, myself included, have argued for 
very strong immediate monetary response to negative shocks, so as to forestall this process 
insofar as possible.  It is impossible to completely offset such negative structural effects, and 
unfortunately, I believe that there is reason to think they will be larger and more immediate in the 
UK today than they were in Japan in the 1990s, as I will discuss shortly.  Yet, large persistent 
output gaps do arise, as Japan demonstrates, and should be treated as reparable.12  They should 
also presumably push down on inflation (as discussed in the explanation of our most recent MPC 
forecast in the May 2010 Inflation Report), though perhaps not as straightforwardly as we used 
to think they would, as I note below. 
Not Rashomon: Japan’s policy measures had mostly textbook effects – 
Rashomon, Kurosawa’s ground-breaking film giving four participants’ differing perspectives on 
the same act of violence, has become a code word for the undependability of human memory, or 
at least the differences in personal experiences of the same event.  Anthropologists, sociologists 
and legal scholars all invoke the ‘Rashomon Effect’ when speaking of contested views of 
causality, for example of guilt and intention in criminal cases.  Here, however, economists 
should be trying to get away from this cinematic – and very human – sense of indeterminacy and 
lack of clarity.  While economics is surely not a science, empirical evaluation of macroeconomic 
policies and their impact can and must proceed on the basis of common standards of evidence 
and argument leading to some accumulation of generally agreed results.   
As Kuttner and Posen (2001) argued, what Japan’s Great Recession demonstrates is the accuracy 
of many of our predictions about policy from the mainstream macroeconomics literature, even of 
the intermediate textbook level.  This is of course of a piece with my broader case that Japan’s 
experience is amenable to the same means of understanding as macroeconomic events in other 
advanced economies, but the point goes further.  We have ways of specifying what was extreme 
or structurally different about Japan’s situation – size of the shock, closedness of the economy, 
 
12 See Bernanke (2000) arguing against “self-induced paralysis” in monetary policy, and also Posen (1999b, 2000).  
The idea that Japan’s difficulties were serious and demand-related was first advanced independently by Krugman 





the zero interest rate bound – and make our policy judgments conditional on those assessments.  
And in the main, those conditional judgments were borne out by the facts. 
If ever there seemed to be a Rashomon Effect in economic policy discussion, it would be with 
regard to fiscal stimulus and its impact.  Whether in Japan in the 1990s or in the US in 2008-
2010, heated discussions take place as though the short-run effects of fiscal policy were in 
dispute.  They should not be.  Fiscal policy works when it is tried.  When one takes into account 
such factors as openness and size of the economy undertaking fiscal policy, and the 
government’s starting debt position, and so on, one can reasonably expect some diminishment of 
fiscal policy’s impact for smaller, more open, more indebted economies.  There is no good 
evidence, however, of strong Ricardian offsets to fiscal policy or of immediate crowding out by 
interest rates (unless the economy is already overheating or at unsustainable debt levels).13 
This is conclusively demonstrated by Japan.14  As we argued in Kuttner and Posen (2002): 
“[O]ur results provide little support for the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis under 
perhaps the most propitious conditions ever seen for it to hold: a rapid and large increase 
in the public debt contemporaneous with a widely publicized projection of the 
demographic dangers to social security benefits, in an economy already prone to high 
rates of saving...Our examination of the effects of fiscal policy in Japan in the 1990s has 
taken us on what seems to be a tour of macroeconomics’ past: when economies were 
closed, savers were myopic, and consequently fiscal stabilization is effective.” (p. 554) 
Charles Horioka and his colleagues predicted and then documented a long-term demographically 
driven decline in Japan’s household savings rate, also totally inconsistent with Ricardian 
predictions.15  In a seminal paper, Broda and Weinstein (2005) assessed the net rather than gross 
debt position of Japanese government, finding it to be only half that often cited gross level, and 
pointed out how demographics did not mean automatic fiscal unsustainability.  Faruqee and 
Muhleisen (2003) showed how even potentially beneficial long-term social security reforms 
would still involve short-term output losses, and that “sharp tightening measures should be held 
back until private demand has reached sustainable levels.” (p.21).     
 
13 Auerbach and Gale (2009) make this argument strongly, assessing the latest developments.  See also Ball and 
Mankiw (2005), Kuttner and Posen (2001), Mankiw and Elmendorf (1998), and Posen (1998). 
14 Not all disagreement on this assessment is ideologically driven.  Complexities of the Japanese fiscal system 
(Broda and Weinstein (2005); Ishii and Wada (1998)) and failure to properly account for the tax revenue impact of 
declining GDP growth (Kuttner and Posen (2002); Posen (1998)) contributed to some of the confusion. 





Note, however, that this assessment is not a blank check for unlimited fiscal stimulus at every 
time, everywhere.  Japan in the 1990s was where fiscal activism should have worked the best, 
being closed, with passive highly home-biased savers, and a large economy with essentially no 
foreign indebtedness.  Having a low government share in GDP and a low tax base also means the 
distortions incurred by sustained fiscal expansions are of relatively low cost.  Looking at today’s 
world, only the US shares these attributes with Japan, and can thus afford to engage in ongoing 
fiscal stimulus in a protracted recession – and the lesser passivity of US savers and increasing 
American foreign indebtedness suggest some limit will be reached.  For smaller, more open 
economies, with larger state sectors, like the United Kingdom, the news is not as good.  There 
will be leakage of fiscal stimulus abroad so it will be less effective than in Japan; the willingness 
of the markets to rollover public debt will be more limited, especially if the size of the public 
sector and the tax share are reaching diminishing returns.16  Cross-national empirical research, 
such as that summarized in Cadoan (2009), supports this view.17  Thus, while fiscal stimulus was 
the right response by a wide range of economies, including the UK, to the immediate crisis in 
2008-09, consistent with one lesson from Japan, we cannot sustain it like Japan should have. 
Monetary policy is another place where research has tried to get past the Rashomon Effect when 
looking at Japan in the 1990s.  We have had considerably more success in getting agreement 
here, not only inside and outside Japan, but across a wide ideological spectrum.  By common 
assent, Bank of Japan policy was too late and too timid in loosening monetary conditions, and 
too reluctant to take up unconventional measures when the zero lower bound on nominal interest 
rates was reached.18  A wide variety of policy response functions have been estimated under 
various assumptions, and essentially all suggest that the BOJ could and should have been more 
aggressive in the early 1990s when rates were above zero and the crisis initially hit.  A good 
example is given in figure 9, from Harrigan and Kuttner (2005).  As Kuttner and Posen (2004) 
point out, these reaction functions are not very robust, and become more difficult to estimate 
 
16 Public sector investment is not worse than private sector investment per se, and having a larger state than the US 
or Japan offers the macroeconomic benefit of greater automatic stabilization, so it is not a one way case. 
17 See also Posen (2005) on the variation in fiscal response and impact with size and openness during Europe’s 
recession of the early 2000’s. 
18 Notable works in this spirit include Ahearne, et al (2002), Bernanke (2000), Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004), 
Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito (2001), Harrigan and Kuttner (2005), Krugman (1998),  Ito and Mishkin (2005), Jinushi, 





meaningfully when deflation occurs – but that only further emphasizes the missed opportunity.  
Some observers would suggest that the monetary game was in some sense lost when 
unconventional measures were not undertaken before longer- term nominal interest rates went to 
zero.19  My personal belief is that the critical though closely related concern is whether the 
financial system is in shape to transmit monetary policy, not the interest rate per se, and that 
when rates go to zero unconventional policy can still work, albeit with difficulty and uncertainty 
about its effects.  (Posen (2009b)) 
Where Rashomon has its revenge is in trying to make sense of what happened subsequently on 
the monetary side.  As shown in figure 10, every measure of inflation in Japan turned negative in 
around 1995, and stayed negative (with only a brief respite in 1998) until at least 2004. It was in 
the second half of this period, from 2001 to 2006, that the Bank of Japan undertook its version of 
‘Quantitative Easing’ to seemingly little nominal effect.  Yes, there was an output gap in the 
early 2000’s still to be absorbed, but it is difficult to reconcile any reasonable estimate of the size 
of that gap – even based on my own previously considered to be too optimistic assessment of 
Japanese potential growth prospects – with the persistence of deflation seen.  Alternatively, if the 
output gap was actually that large, why did deflation not accelerate over the course of the 1990s 
instead of remaining stable?  There certainly was no shortage of narrow money creation or of 
government bond purchases by the Bank of Japan when they got started, and no concomitant 
increase in broad money growth (see figure 11).   
The general assessment by econometric investigators to date is that QE did have some impact on 
inflation expectations and expectations about monetary policy as a commitment mechanism, but 
had little direct effect on asset or other prices.20 Thus, a key part of the Bank of Japan’s efforts at 
combating deflation was the public commitment given in 2002 to maintain low rates until 
inflation was reliably forecast to remain positive (Posen (2004b)).  Figure 12, extending a chart 
from Kuttner and Posen (2004), suggests that ‘deflation scares’ where the Bank of Japan was 
seen to be threatening rate hikes did have an impact on long-term interest rates and presumably 
 
19 Krugman (1998) sets out the theory of the liquidity trap, while Tucker (2009) cites this concern in guiding his 
policy activist decisions of 2009 at the Bank of England. 
20 Ugai (2006) gives a useful summary of some of the assessments.  See also Baba, et al (2005), Baba, et al (2006), 
Kimura and Small (2006), Oda and Ueda (2005), Okina and Shiratsuka (2004), and Ueda (2002).  Tomas 





expectations beyond that of the world (US) interest rate, and that these have been absent since 
the Bank of Japan’s commitment to pursue positive inflation.  But we all must admit that it is 
rather difficult to tell in any convincing rather than suggestive manner. 
This leads of course directly to concerns about the Bank of England’s own QE policy of late and 
its impact.  As also shown in figure 11, the Bank of England has created narrow money at an 
even faster rate, sooner, than the Bank of Japan did, and seemingly has had just as little impact 
on broad money growth.  In part, this is overstated, because the private counterparties from 
whom the Bank of England buys its gilts in the secondary market (i.e., pension funds and 
insurance companies) are different from the counterparties of the Bank of Japan on its purchases 
(banks), so controlling for that in the flow of funds reveals a slightly higher broad money growth 
rate.  Much more importantly, however, the proof is in the outcome: inflation has remained 
positive in the UK, despite at least as large a negative shock as Japan experienced in 1992, and 
that seems in part to be driven by QE’s affect on asset prices.21  My MPC colleague, Spencer 
Dale (2010) recently summarized the results of some of the Bank staff’s own research: 
“[A]bsent the monetary injection, broad money would almost certainly have been far 
weaker...summing movements in gilt-OIS spreads following our [asset purchase] 
announcements suggests that the portfolio balance effect may have reduced gilt yields by 
around 100 basis points...Since we started QE, equity prices have increased by more than 
50%, and corporate bond yields have fallen by over 400 basis points.” 
In Japan during the Bank of Japan’s QE period there was no such fall in corporate bond yields 
and even some rise (albeit from very low levels probably reflecting the recovery), and there 
certainly was no 50% rise in equity prices.  It remains to be seen whether the equity rise in the 
UK and elsewhere is sustainable (I have no opinion, just hopes).  Moreover, even if the Bank of 
England successfully avoids both deflation and inflation in contrast to Japan’s deflation, but 
Japan has yet another recovery and the UK recovery is weak or cutoff, that is not a happy 
outcome for the UK vis-a-vis Japan. 
To me, the upshot of all of this Rashomon effect about QE there and here is twofold. One, of 
course, is a call for more and cleverer research than I and others have mustered to date – research 
 
21 No, I am not happy that UK CPI inflation is currently overshooting the Bank’s government given inflation target.  
As I have said in the press of late, if this proves to be other than temporary factors at work, the MPC should take 





that should focus less on the immediate announcement or asset price impact of QE (though that 
was the right place to start), and more on the transmission mechanism.  It is at least plausible that 
part of the better real economic results Japan had over the course of the 2000’s than the UK has 
since early 2009 is due to the more advanced state of the banking system restructuring 
undertaken by Takenaka in 2003 versus what has been done to date in the UK and in other major 
markets.  That should, however, have shown up somewhere in broad money growth at some 
time, one would think.  We also need more research on the costs of deflation, and why they seem 
to have been much lower in Japan than we reasonably would have expected ex ante.  There is no 
question that deflation has been a drag on growth, and, even at Japan’s low interest rates, make 
government debt service more difficult.  But it has not been a disaster.22 
The other lesson for me, as a central banker, is to have much more humility about what we are 
capable of doing with monetary policy, especially with unconventional measures.23  Monetary 
policy has been unable in Japan remove deflation quickly in any easy way. Even the above zero 
inflation we have maintained in the UK has hardly been commensurate with what many of the 
monetarist persuasion would have predicted, given the scale of the Bank of England’s asset 
purchases (Posen (2009b)).  We also do not understand deflation very well - whatever type of 
standard macro model one uses for analysis, you will find it difficult to generate the persistent 
for a decade, sticky, but steady at -1%, deflation Japan experienced, rather than something that 
accelerated either up or down, and did more harm.24  As a result, we should stay away from very 
mechanistic monetarism that, “Oh, boy, they’ve printed a lot of money so at some point that has 
to turn into inflation.” Or, “If we do this specific amount of quantitative easing, so it will lead to 
this result.” Looking at Japan, it is clear that their quantitative easing measures had the right sign, 
in the sense of removing fears of tightening, but did not have a predictable or even large short-
term result, let alone cause high inflation. 
A Partial Remake?: Where the UK has some Japanese risks – 
 
22 A partial explanation for that may be the real and nominal wage flexibility in Japan. See Kimura and Ueda (2001). 
23 I have made this point in appearances before both the UK House of Commons Treasury Select Committee and the 
US Congress Joint Economic Committee.  Setting the bar of expectations low for my own role might be a factor. 





As I said earlier, Kurosawa not only brought Western models and inspiration into his films in 
Japan, but he in turn inspired remakes and homages, or even particular scenes, in Western films 
in turn.  So if the macroeconomic policy response undertaken so far by the UK and other major 
economies makes it unlikely our economy will ‘turn Japanese’ precisely – especially now that I 
have explained to you what turning Japanese actually meant in the 1990s and 2000s – what 
particular aspects of Japan’s Great Recession might be relevant and of concern?  What kind of 
remake might we see of the story for an unwilling UK audience?  Unfortunately, the ironic twist 
for this upcoming film is that in some ways the remake might be scarier than the original. That 
risk arises not only because the original Great Recession was not quite so scary as previously 
thought on close viewing, but because Japan actually had various resources with which to 
manage its situation while the UK and other economies are not similarly endowed, even if some 
Japanese policymakers failed to take advantage of them. 
The first set of advantages Japan had over the UK today in responding to a recessionary shock 
comes from its relative closedness and passivity of its domestic savers and investors.  Fiscal 
stimulus will be more limited in its effect and less sustainable on a large scale in the UK than it 
was in Japan.  The threat of savings leaving the UK for other currency-denominated assets is 
low, but not zero, and has responded to fiscal concerns in the past. In contrast, clearly Japanese 
savers have been unwilling to move a large share of their savings abroad, no matter what has 
occurred with public debt to date.25  The multiplier on Japanese fiscal stimulus was higher than it 
has been in the UK. The upshot is that declaring a limit on fiscal stimulus in the UK well before 
Japan should have is sound policy, yet no one should doubt this will be painful in terms of 
aggregate GDP growth (beyond its direct human effects), either.  The loss may be less than some 
fear, since a low multiplier works for cuts as well as spending, but given where interest rates are 
now, there will be no bonus from fiscal discipline.  This is about pre-empting an interest rate rise.   
A second difference from Japan that works against the UK in our current situation is the amount 
of reallocation of labor and capital across sectors that we need to undertake.  Japan did and does 
have a number of inefficient industries, and during the boom of the 1980s and even after had 
 
25 Nishimura (2007) gives a fascinating analysis of capital flows and household savings behavior in Japan, noting 
among other things that very large outflows in absolute terms from Japan are only a small portion of investors’ 




unsustainably huge numbers of people employed in construction (Kuttner and Posen (2001)).  
The most inefficient industries, however, were in Japan’s non-traded sector: health care, retail, 
food production and distribution, as well as construction; by contrast, the export industries were 
and remain highly competitive (Posen (2001a, 2002)), and Japan was running a trade surplus 
except for a few years.  The UK at present has to reallocate labor and capital into export-oriented 
industries from where there has been domestic growth (health care and other services; 
construction), or where the former export demand has suffered a structural decline (financial 
services).  The challenge should not be overstated, for the UK has one of the most flexible 
economies in the world, past adjustment of the trade-weighted pound should ease the process, 
and many recent survey-based and orders indicators suggest that UK manufacturing is 
responding well to the shift in demand.  That said, this challenge should not be dismissed, and 
may have something to do with the disappointing performance of UK net exports over the last 
several months of global and UK recovery. 
A third place where Japan had an advantage in its recovery, which the UK but also several other 
economies do not share, is in the availability of growing export markets.  The role of exports in 
Japan’s economy overall and in its recovery of 2002-2008 is usually exaggerated.  As shown in 
figure 3, net exports played a meaningful but not majority role.  If anything, though, the UK – 
and for that matter almost all other advanced economies except the US – is more dependent on 
trade as a share of the economy than Japan.  During Japan’s Great Recession, its primary trading 
partners like the US were enjoying strong growth, and its immediate neighbours were only 
briefly (though sharply) in recession in 1997-98.  In the 2000’s, developing Asia and particularly 
China took in an increasing share of Japanese exports, as shown in figure 13.  The UK faces a 
double-limitation on export-led growth in comparison.  First, with most of the Western 
economies in recession, there is more competition for export markets, and presumably at some 
point the US, too, will have to close its trade deficit.  As widely noted, not everyone can be a net 
exporter at the same time. Second and more pressingly, the UK’s major export market remains 
the Euro Area, as shown in figure 14.  Let us just say that the prospects for strong growth in most 
of the Euro Area are rather dim for the next several years, as are the prospects for a sustained 





and trade patterns can change, especially if the China-bloc allows their currencies to adjust in 
line with their productivity and domestic demand growth.  But it does not help. 
There are also two parallels for the UK with less salutary aspects of Japan’s situation.  One I 
brought up in a speech last October (Posen (2009b)).  As summarized in figure 15, the UK has 
limited alternative sources of corporate finance to its few big banks, some of whom are 
obviously still impaired, and all of whom have to increase their capital bases and/or shrink their 
balance sheets.  The UK is thus similar to Japan, and unlike most other advanced economies, in 
terms of its vulnerability to financial fragility.  So far, there is some reason to think that a lot of 
the very sharp decline in investment the UK experienced over the past 18-24 months can be 
accounted for by a decline in investment demand, driven by uncertainty and temporarily (we 
hope) lower growth prospects, and not be solely ascribed to a credit crunch.  As I said in 
October, the test will come when the recovery, thankfully now underway, leads to increased 
investment demand by new firms and SME’s – will the concentrated and part-nationalized UK 
banking system be ready to meet the demand for capital?  In Japan, this kind of credit crunch did 
play a key role in the third recession of the 1990s, until the bank reform of 2002. 
Another parallel has emerged from some recent research in progress I have undertaken with Neil 
Meads at the Bank.  One distinctive aspect of Japan’s recovery was the accumulation of large 
surpluses in the Japanese non-financial corporate sector, as depicted in figure 16.26  These 
reached a high of nearly 10% of GDP in the middle of the 2000s, and after declining during the 
global financial crisis have begun climbing again.  This pattern was unusual, and sometimes 
ascribed to Japan’s corporate governance.  Yet, of late, we have seen a similar pattern emerge in 
the UK.  As shown in figure 17, since the global shock of 2008, UK non-financial corporate have 
had their own surplus rise towards 8% of GDP.  The good news is that this rules out a balance 
sheet recession here as well (ditto for most households, though not quite so strongly so).  The 
bad news is if this indicates some form of self-insurance by companies against lack of future 
access to credit, in line with the structural financial parallels to Japan I set out, this will constrain 
 
26 An interesting side note is that this chart largely gives the lie to claims that Japan suffered a ‘balance sheet 
recession,’ another of the Ran-type one-shock-and-done candidate explanations for the Great Recession.  As is clear 





investment until access is credibly restored – which might take restructuring the UK financial 
system (not a bad idea).   
The worst news would be if this sitting on funds was not temporary but lasting.  In that case, it 
would represent a lack of faith in future UK economic prospects, meaning that despite all my 
arguments UK investors do feel that their workers all woke up minus some body parts, or that 
their previously purchased capital stock was somehow now redundant.  That would be a 
structural slump, with all the prospects for higher inflation (due to smaller output gap) and 
slower growth (due to lower productivity trend) that portends.  I do not believe this to be the 
case. But even if it were, here is where the United Kingdom’s openness comes to our rescue in 
the end, and Japan’s closed corporate governance came back to bite it.  As shown in figure 18, 
the UK has been consistently more willing to invest abroad than Japan.  Even in the worst times 
in the Great Recession, Japanese corporations sat on their cash, neither engaging in large-scale 
FDI where productivity and growth prospects were higher, nor returning their cash to investors 
(who would not move it abroad in any event).27   
In the UK, even leaving aside the spike around 2000 related to some takeover activity, 
corporations and their investors have been willing to move direct investment abroad in search of 
higher returns.  It is possible that some of what appears to accumulation of cash surpluses by UK 
corporations over the last two years are actually acquisitions of investments abroad, which would 
show up on the balance sheet as assets without showing up in GDP flows as corporate 
investment.  It certainly has not been due to M&A activity of late.  If that proves to be the case, 
returns on savings and corporate profits will be higher than they were for trapped capital in 
Japan, which in turn will more sustainably feed consumption and productivity growth.  So the 
UK remake of the Japanese recession film need not be entirely a morose tear-jerker. 
Perhaps Seven Samurai: A concluding note for policymakers – 
Arguably Kurosawa’s greatest film, and my personal favourite, is The Seven Samurai (Shichinin 
no Samurai).28  The plot, having been emulated or remade by numerous subsequent filmmakers, 
 
27 Alexander (2007) has an excellent discussion of returns to capital and comparative returns on FDI for Japan.  See 
also Fukao (1995) regarding globalization and corporate governance in general terms. 




should be familiar to many who have not even seen the film.  A village of farmers are threatened 
by a severe negative shock, that bandits will return after the harvest to steal their crops.  They are 
incapable of defending the hard won fruits of their labor from this onslaught on their own.  The 
farmers hire seven masterless samurai to organize their defense, if not able to defend them 
directly. The farmers, however, have limited resources to provide for their defense or paying the 
samurai, and what they have is being hoarded in precautionary saving against the coming shock.  
The samurai restore confidence to the village, and with an activist strategy to fight off the 
bandits, albeit at a high cost in their lives lost.  With the bandits defeated, the regular cycle of 
farmers planting for the next year’s harvest begins again, surprisingly happily.  The surviving 
three samurai have won the battle for the farmers, but they have lost their comrades with no 
place in normal society to show for it. "Again we are defeated," their leader, Kambei muses. 
"The farmers have won. Not us." 
I hope you see where I am going with this, and it is not to overdramatize the pressures of being a 
central banker (actually a very nice if demanding job).  Macroeconomic policymakers really 
should have little to do when the business cycle is following its normal path.  Fine tuning is 
unnecessary, although obviously some ongoing unobtrusive monitoring of the situation is useful.  
When a clear, large negative shock threatens to pull the cycle down into severe contraction, 
central bankers and (to the extent feasible) fiscal authorities have to intervene, and do so pro-
actively.  No one should be over-confident that the shock can be costlessly offset or restored 
fully to status quo ante bellum.  Part of responding to a large negative shock successfully in fact 
requires the policymakers to successful instil confidence and mobilize the general public.  But 
when it is all over, and even when the policy response has fended off the worst, the best a 
macroeconomic policymaker can hope for is for the citizens to return to the normal cycle of life 
– and desire the monetary samurai to go away again, unless and until another shock comes.  May 
it only be so that the UK recovers to its normal cycle of growth sufficiently, so that I and my 
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